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Critical Perspective on Discourse in the Representation of Conflict 
in Ireland 
 
Féilim Ó hAdhmaill, University College Cork 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides a critical analysis of the role of discourse in conflict situations, with 
a particular focus on dominant and competing discourses which have emerged in relation 
to conflict in Ireland historically. It begins with a general discussion about theoretical 
ideas around discourse, focusing in particular on the writings of critical theorists such as 
Gramsci, and Foucault. It engages with some of the key ideas about common-sense 
acceptance, reproduction and reinforcement of dominant hegemonic discourses, and how 
such hegemony emerges and is sustained. It also looks at how subordinate discourses 
often challenge and replace once dominant discourses. It then analyses how discourse 
plays a role in conflict in society and how discourse, like conflict itself, often changes in 
form and content depending on circumstance. Using examples of discourse, sourced from 
the print media and academic literature, about conflict in Ireland, the language and 
terminology used and how this has framed competing understandings and interpretations 
of the conflict, the article illustrates how conflict is reflected in competing discourses 
including dominant and subordinate variants. It argues that uncritical, unqualified 
acceptance of dominant discourse about conflict by academia and others potentially 
prevents the development of rigorous social scientific research, the unravelling of the 
underlying causes of conflict as well as potentially delaying the onset of real and 
meaningful peace building. It also potentially places academia firmly on the side of the 
status quo in conflict situations. 
 







This paper aims to critically analyse the role of discourse, in reflecting, creating reproducing 
and reinforcing knowledge about conflict situations. It focuses, in particular on dominant and 
competing discourses which have emerged in relation to political conflict in Ireland, often 
linked to power as well as ideology. It aims to show that: i) different competing discourses 
exist, using different language and terminology to describe the same conflict and that ii) these 
discourses reflect different understandings and may include elements which are honest, or 
mistaken or sometimes deliberately misleading. There is often no one ‘absolute truth’ about a 
conflict situation, which all can agree upon. Indeed, an in-depth comprehension of each 
discourse is essential to develop a real understanding of conflict and promote peacebuilding. 
The paper argues that a rigorous social science needs to recognise that the unquestioning 
acceptance of dominant linguistic representations of conflict in the world may obscure 
complexities of the many conflicts which such representations often deny. In particular, the 
paper argues that uncritical, unqualified acceptance of the dominant discourse about conflict 
by academia potentially prevents the development of rigorous social scientific research, the 
unravelling of the underlying causes of conflict as well as potentially delaying the onset of real 
and meaningful peace building. It also potentially places academia firmly on the side of the 
status quo in conflict situations – “the rhetorical servant of the established order” (Gearty, 2002, 
p. 37).  
The paper begins with a theoretical discussion around discourse, its role in knowledge creation, 
reproduction and reinforcement, and its inter-relationship with ideology and the role of power, 
focusing in particular, on the writings of critical theorists such as Antonio Gramsci and Michel 
Foucault. It engages with some of the key ideas about ‘common-sense’ acceptance, 
reproduction and reinforcement of dominant hegemonic discourses, and how such hegemony 
emerges and is sustained. The paper looks at how subordinate discourses often challenge and 
replace once dominant discourses. It also analyses how discourse plays a role in conflict in 
society and how discourse like conflict itself often changes in form and content depending on 
circumstance. 
There then follows a discussion of dominant and competing discourses which have emerged in 
relation to conflict in Ireland. By using examples of discourse, sourced from the print media 
and academic literature, about conflict in Ireland, by considering language and terminology, 




conflict, the paper illustrates how such different understandings of the conflict are reflected in 
competing discourses including dominant and subordinate variants.  
 
2. Methodology and Theoretical Framework: Critical Perspectives on Discourse, 
Power, and Ideology in Society 
The methodology primarily involves a review of relevant academic literature but also includes 
the collection, processing and qualitative analysis of 525 newspaper reports pertaining to 
conflict in Ireland. The reports were collected from four newspapers – the Irish News, the 
Newsletter, the Belfast Telegraph and the Irish Times over the years 2016-2020 on a systematic 
basis, as part of a wider research project relating to the decade of centenary commemorations; 
many of the reports relate to different views on the historic conflict from the 1916-20 period. 
The first three newspapers are the main newspapers in the north, reflecting unionist and 
nationalist perspectives, while the Irish Times would be viewed as probably the most 
authoritative broadsheet in the south.  
Discourse relates to the language used in conversation, writing, and thought. It frames our 
meanings and understandings of the world and thus constructs knowledge about the world 
(Hall, 1997). It refers to how we communicate, represent and think about people, groups, race, 
and religions as well as the economy, social institutions, social relationships, and society in 
general. It can influence, reinforce or change our behaviours and opinions. Indeed, according 
to Hall (1997): 
The knowledge which a particular discourse produces connects with power, regulates 
conduct, makes up or constructs identities and subjectivities, and defines the way 
certain things are represented, thought about, practised and studied. (p. 6) 
Discourse can operate in different ways at different levels and in different parts of the same 
society. Gee (2008) for example talks about different discourse communities, where the same 
people may talk and act in different ways to suit different social contexts and circumstances. 
Gee makes a distinction between discourse relating to the language used in social interactions 
and Discourse with a capital D which links with wider social practices, behaviour, values, ways 





What it means is that what meanings we give to words is based on knowledge we 
acquire and choices we make, as well as values and beliefs—and, yes, even interests—
we have. Words are consequential. They matter. Words and the world are married. (p 5) 
For Critical Discourse Analysis theorists such as Fairclough (1992; 1995), Van Dijk (2006) 
and Wodak (2009), discourse cannot be adequately analysed in isolation from the realities of 
social context, structures of power, inequalities, and ideology in society. Indeed ideology, as a 
particular worldview, is often viewed as shaping discourse. It is through discourse that a 
particular ideology is organised and expressed in thought and language. This can operate at 
both a conscious or unconscious level reproducing and reinforcing particular ideological 
perspectives, assumptions, and value systems. While different competing discourses can exist 
in the same society, once a discourse becomes dominant throughout society, it, in turn, 
influences the reproduction and reinforcement of a particular ideology. 
For Foucault, discourse is closely linked to both power and knowledge. It can provide 
legitimacy for certain kinds of ‘knowledge’ while undermining others. If linked to power it can 
create, reinforce and reproduce a particular worldview. Power is conveyed by discourse. Each 
society has social institutions, which act as custodians of knowledge and authority. Influenced 
by ideology, these shape the production of discourse and knowledge, and create ‘regimes of 
truth’: 
Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth; that is, the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is 
sanctioned […] the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 131) 
Looking at the transition in France from monarchy to liberal democracy as a result of the French 
Revolution, Foucault argued that it was an oversimplification to say that power had moved 
from monarch to the people. People could be controlled by the ability of those in government 
and in charge of institutions to create a framework of agreed rules and social norms. New, more 
humane practices of discipline and surveillance used in prisons, asylums, schools, and 
workhouses, linked to the growth in acceptance of ‘rational’ scientific ideas and new 
technologies, created compliant human beings who grew to internalise these accepted ‘norms’ 




rested everywhere. People could resist. The battle over truth was over the ‘accepted’ norms 
and beliefs in a society, rather than an objective absolute truth (Foucault, 1980; 1975). 
Foucault was writing primarily about specific institutions such as those related to punishment 
and imprisonment, deviance, sexuality, medicine, psychiatry and madness, but his work has 
informed ideas about discourse generally (Hall, 1997). When linked to power a discourse can 
promote, reinforce and reproduce one particular dominant view in society. Thus, having the 
power to create, promote and control a dominant discourse in a society may have a dramatic 
effect on how people think and act in that society. Dominant discourses are therefore of great 
interest to critical social scientists as they challenge/question what is taking place in a society.  
Critical social science starts from a recognition of inequalities in power relationships in society, 
arguing that these are neither just nor sustainable. It attempts to unmask underlying structures 
and practices that can be obscured by the dominant ideology. To ignore them is to be complicit 
in reproducing and reinforcing them. As Harvey (1990) explains:  
critical social research does not take the apparent social structure, social processes or 
accepted history for granted. It tries to dig beneath the surface of appearances. It asks 
how social systems really work, how ideology or history conceals the processes which 
oppress and control people […]. In its engagement with oppressive structures it 
questions the nature of prevailing knowledge and directs attention at the processes and 
institutions which legitimate knowledge (Harvey, 1990, Criticism and Knowledge 
section, para 2). 
For Marx, for example, the dominant discourse of a ‘free market’ was just a veil to conceal the 
true exploitative and oppressive nature of capitalist society. Capitalists controlled the 
institutions of society which in turn controlled most of the population, the workers. The police 
and army controlled through force, the Government through legislation, the Church, education 
system and the media through manipulation and propaganda. Marx argued that the Church, 
State, education system, the arts, and literature, all form a superstructure which promotes an 
ideology supporting the status quo, serving the interests of the real rulers of the world – the 
capitalists. Marx’s role was to strip away the mask of this ideology, unveil the truth about the 
exploitation and challenge ‘false consciousness’ where workers fail to recognise their ‘class’ 
and ‘class interests’ (Marx & Engels, 1932/2001).  
Gramsci (1971), in particular, questioned how powerful elites in society are able to convince 




interests to do so. ‘Ideological hegemony’ allowed one class to dominate another through 
consent rather than force, although a combination of physical force or coercion with 
intellectual, moral and cultural inducement may be necessary. In this way, the ideological 
perspective of the powerful was understood to be ‘common sense’ by the masses. The Frankfurt 
School, led by Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and others, agreed with Gramsci. They 
discussed the factors which inhibit criticism and analysis of society, in particular pointing to 
the growth of ‘instrumental reason’ which is seen as the dominant way of thinking in capitalist 
societies. The search for the most efficient way to achieve ends generates an uncritical attitude 
towards the ends pursued. In One Dimensional Man, originally published in 1964, Marcuse 
argued that the mass of the population in advanced capitalist societies are manipulated, in the 
interests of capitalism, by political elites and the mass media. The latter obscure people’s true 
needs with the promotion of false needs associated with consumption, while technology, rather 
than helping to meet people’s true needs, is geared towards producing profitable consumer 
goods: 
One-dimensional thought is systematically promoted by the makers of politics and their 
purveyors of mass information. Their universe of discourse is populated by self-
validating hypotheses which, incessantly and monopolistically repeated, become 
hypnotic definitions or dictations. (Marcuse, 2002, p. 16) 
The control of society through manipulation was of particular interest to Mills. In The 
Sociological Imagination (2000) he argued:  
We cannot assume today that men must in the last resort be governed by their own 
consent. Among the means of power that now prevail is the power to manage and to 
manipulate the consent of men. That we do not know the limits of such power— and 
that we hope it does have limits—does not remove the fact that much power today is 
successfully employed without the sanction of the reason or the conscience of the 
obedient. (pp. 40-41) 
In Manufacturing Consent Herman and Chomsky (1988), further argued that in western liberal 
democracies ‘consent’ is actually ‘manufactured’ to serve the interests of powerful elites in 
society and that the media play a vital role in creating this ‘consent’. 
Of course, dominant discourses may also be contested by subordinate ones. In Foucault’s view 
for example, power resides everywhere, though that does not necessarily mean that everyone 




thinking, questioning, ending subservience to ‘experts’ and establishing the democratisation of 
the education process – could change how we think, how we learn, how we view the world and 
how we act (to change it):  
… every human being, no matter how "ignorant" or submerged in the "culture of 
silence" he or she may be, is capable of looking critically at the world in a dialogical 
encounter with others. (p. 32) 
 
3. Discourse and Conflict 
During conflicts, discourse reflects how we think and communicate about the conflict, and the 
language, words, and assumptions used to represent people and events. It may include ideas, 
beliefs, assumptions, and shared values, as well as the terminology, words and phrases used to 
convey them. Each side’s perspective will be reflected in a discourse. Competing discourses 
reflect, reinforce and reproduce different understandings, meanings and ‘truths’ about the 
conflict, and influence which rationale for the conflict and which participants should be viewed 
as ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ in the eyes of the people and thus what or who should be 
supported. The discourse, if any, which becomes dominant in a conflict situation, and the role 
power plays in this is linked to wider questions such as what is the relationship between power 
and discourse in society and how are dominant discourses created and maintained? 
A critical perspective on discourse in conflict situations argues that both the overt and hidden 
meanings and understandings transmitted in dominant discourse may promote one particular 
ideological perspective and understanding but cast a veil over others. Thus, to find out what is 
really happening in a conflict situation, the circumstances and the events, it is important to 
question the language being used, the words and the terminology. 
Discourses can of course be relatively ‘honest’ and open, based on the perspective of the 
protagonist. However, they can also be deliberately misleading, aimed at hiding the ‘real’ 
reasons for the conflict. They can also be unintentionally misleading, based on false, 
incomplete, misinterpreted or misleading ‘knowledge’ and information. Dissenting voices can 
also challenge the ‘truths’ in any discourse. Each side therefore must struggle to ensure that its 
voice becomes dominant, among its own support base initially and then within wider society. 
That requires developing the necessary power, skills and tactics to promote one particular 
discourse and weaken another. For less powerful groups this presents a challenge. Lenin (1906) 




‘democratic centralism’, freedom of discussion but unity of action. Alinsky, in his Rules of 
Radicals (1971) concentrated more on tactics; weaker groups can mobilise and by using the 
right tactics for the right situation, maintain and grow their own support base while weakening 
their stronger opponent. Sometimes reasoned argument and dialogue is sufficient; sometimes 
overt or covert means for winning ‘acceptance’ for one discourse is required. Powerful groups 
or governments can often influence discourse by overt coercive measures such as banning free 
speech, protest or expression and using the police or military to oppressively police any 
dissention. However, this may simply drive alternative voices underground, build up further 
resentment and lead to a resurgence of opposition in the future. Being able to gain supposedly 
‘freely given’ acceptance for a particular discourse through manipulation and propaganda, may 
be more beneficial. The role of social institutions, the Church, the education system, censorship 
and the media are important as is the regulation of public space where physical and 
communicative interactions can take place. 
Sometimes a subordinate discourse becomes dominant within a group, neighbourhood, or 
‘side’ in the conflict, or in a state fighting against another state. It becomes the accepted ‘truth’ 
and over-rules minority discourses. The winners in a conflict usually create a dominant 
discourse justifying themselves and reproducing and reinforcing this justification, via the 
media, education, history, folklore, Church, state and social institutions. Sometimes this 
discourse is eventually accepted by the ‘losers’. For example, despite the continuing existence 
of the far right in parts of Germany, the dominant discourse about Nazi Germany is negative 
and quite similar to that of the rest of Europe. If the Nazis had won would that still be the case? 
What if no single discourse about a conflict becomes dominant, or there are no clear ‘winners’ 
or ‘losers’? What if minority discourses are maintained alongside dominant ones? In a ‘post-
conflict’ society is it always possible to create a shared discourse? And if a shared discourse 
cannot be achieved, does this lead to continuing trauma, grievance and potential conflict in the 
future?  
Discourse, by its nature, must change to reflect both changing circumstances in society and 
changing events within a conflict. Like the conflict itself it evolves. The initial ‘causes’ of the 
conflict may be replaced. Events/issues resulting from the conflict itself, may feed and sustain 
it, as the original issues become forgotten or resolved or irrelevant and enthusiasm wanes; or it 
is replaced by a new enthusiasm for something else. The politics of the last atrocity may also 
reign. For example, in the north of Ireland dissatisfaction with Partition, British-rule and 




equal citizenship within the UK. This was reflected in the demise of the old constitutional 
Nationalist Party and its replacement by what was to become in 1970 the Social Democratic 
and Labour Party (SDLP). For others though, the discourse of civil rights was quickly replaced 
in the turmoil of the rioting, intimidation and killings of 1969, by the alternative discourse of 
‘resistance’ and then ‘rebellion’. The dominant government discourse altered little. Northern 
Ireland was under attack by first civil rights and now the IRA. 
Often conflict and its causes can be very complex. There may be a range of causes: personal, 
interpersonal, community-based, or ideal-based. Causes may be rational, based on interests, 
values, or beliefs. They may be based on past events, current concerns or worries about the 
future. They may be based on particular understandings of reality, misunderstandings, 
misinterpretation, lack of knowledge or information or misleading information. They 
invariably involve emotions. Indeed, there can be a range of interlocking causes. These may or 
may not be reflected in discourse about the conflict; discourse is often deliberately or 
unintentionally misleading about both the causes and the opponents. The presenting issue may 
not be the real underlying issue or issues. Indeed, there may be complex layers of factors some 
of which remain hidden. 
It is important to note that conflict can take different forms in society. It does not have to be 
violent. Indeed, most critical perspectives will argue that not only is conflict natural in society, 
it is needed to progress society, to challenge and to develop new ideas or new ways of 
organising or running society. It is the destructive forms of conflict which need to be addressed 
rather than conflict itself. ‘Conflict transformation’ is sometimes posited as a solution to 
destructive conflicts rather than necessarily ‘conflict resolution’ (Lederach, 1995). Thus 
conflict is transformed from a destructive to a less destructive form by transforming the context 
in which it operates. An example might be the transformation from civil war in Ireland (1922-
23) to the conflict that takes place in Leinster House (the Irish Parliament). Discourse about 
conflict thus can include justifications or denunciations of violence or the promotion of non-
violent, constitutional, democratic, peaceful means. 
 
4. Discourse and Conflict in Ireland  
The current ‘decade of centenaries’ relating to the 1912-23 period of conflict in Ireland, and 
how to commemorate them (if at all) poses many questions for academics and politicians alike. 




have invariably been associated with Ireland’s historical relationship with Britain, the legacy 
of this, and of the resultant challenges to the legitimacy of authority and institutions. Competing 
discourses about such conflict have been influenced by different political and ideological 
perspectives on the islands of Ireland, Britain and elsewhere, and are reflected in conflicting 
language and terminology used to convey understandings, interpretations and meanings. With 
continuing political and ideological division on the island about both the causes of the conflict 
and the solution, these competing discourses continue to challenge attempts to not just 
remember the past but to agree on the future. The legacy of the 1912-23 period was not a lasting 
peace agreement and national reconciliation, but a continuing conflict, violent and non-violent, 
throughout much of the 20th century culminating in the ‘Troubles’ in the north from 1969-97, 
the ‘legacy’ of which further feeds the competing discourses.   
These competing discourses are reflected in terminology and symbolism, in speech, song, 
monuments, flags, and murals, used to remember events and describe the different sides (Bryan 
& Gillespie, 2005). They are also reflected in academia. Even the use of terminology such as 
‘colonialism’ is contested, with some historians arguing that Ireland was part of the UK from 
1801 and not a colony during either the campaign for Home Rule/Independence or during the 
recent conflict, 1969-97, in the north (Miller, 1998). While the dominant discourse in the south 
of Ireland terms the events of 1919-21, as the ‘War of Independence’ (Crowley et al., 2017), 
others refer to IRA actions then as ‘murder’. In the north those events are invariably referred 
to as ‘the Troubles’ (as is the 1969-97 period). Most unionists echo the words of Arlene Foster, 
the Northern Ireland First Minister and Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) Leader, in viewing, 
both periods of conflict as ‘terrorism’ and ‘an attack on British democracy’ (Arlene Foster: 
Why I did not go to the Dublin centenary event, 2016). Such views have not changed much in 
the past 100 years. In 1920, unionist discourse, similar to the UK government discourse 
(Walker, 2020), termed the IRA as ‘murder gangs’ attempting to ‘terrorise’ the population into 
an Irish republic. For example, in the debate on the Government of Ireland Bill, in Westminster 
in May 1920, Colonel Walter Guinness, a southern Ireland Conservative MP talked about the 
fear of ‘terrorism’ felt by Irish unionists at the prospect of Home Rule (Phoenix, 1920/2020, 
May).   
Of course, the activities of the RIC (and the Black and Tans)1 along with the UVF, a unionist 
militia created in Ulster in 1913 to oppose Irish nationalism (Bowman, 2017), were likewise 
                                                          
1 The RIC (Royal Irish Constabulary) was an armed paramilitary organisation established by the UK Government 




branded as ‘terrorism’ by mainstream nationalist opinion at that time as illustrated in media 
reports of UVF attacks on nationalist areas of Derry City in June 1920 (Phoenix, 1920/2020, 
June).  Nationalists on the streets of Belfast, also termed RIC assassinations the work of “the 
Murder Gang” (Baker, 2003, p. 53; Glennon, 2020).   
Most northern nationalists, while probably supportive of the IRA who fought in the 1919-21 
period, would also be unlikely to describe the events as the ‘War of Independence’. The ‘War’ 
did not bring ‘independence’ for them, so the term has had little meaning for them. They also 
lived in a society where the dominant discourse has been that the IRA of that period and 
throughout the 20th century were ‘terrorists’ and where expressing support for any form of 
republicanism, at least until the late 1990s, was very dangerous. The IRA was illegal, and 
support for it or its political wing could lead to arrest/harassment at the hands of the 
police/British Army and potential targets for loyalist militias (Cadwallader, 2013). 
The more recent violent conflict (1969-97) was mainly confined to the north of the country, 
with no clearly defined ‘winners’ or ‘losers’ and a peace settlement’ in 1998 which has been 
described as more related to ‘conflict transformation’ than ‘conflict resolution’ (Shirlow et al., 
2005). It is also represented differently in the competing discourses (and there are more than 
two), reflecting different understandings and interpretations. The often-bitter debates around 
the causes and 'legacy’ of that conflict and indeed the merits or otherwise of the 'peace process' 
itself reflect these differences (Dixon, 2018).  
In the north, Sinn Féin, the main nationalist party present a discourse of a risen people 
continuing the struggle of the early 20th century, opposing British colonial rule and military 
occupation. For example, Sinn Féin leader, Mary Lou McDonald stated in May 2020 that “the 
IRA’s campaign was justified” (Hughes, 2020). The main unionist party, the DUP, like the 
other Unionist parties, views the conflict as having been a terrorist conspiracy aimed at 
destroying Northern Ireland as an entity and attacking democracy. In November 2017 for 
example, the DUP leader Arlene Foster responded to a Sinn Féin MP describing the deceased 
leader, Martin McGuinness as a ‘“proud member of the IRA’ at the party’s Ard Fheis by 
condemning Sinn Féin’s ‘glorification […] of the IRA and terrorism’” (Arlene Foster 
condemns Sinn Féin ‘glorification of terrorism’. 2017). 
                                                          
auxiliary police force recruited mainly among ex-British soldiers to supplement the RIC in its battle against the 




The discourse of the northern pro-nationalist but anti-IRA Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP) views both the unionists and the IRA as having been wrong, the former for rejecting 
reform or power sharing and the latter for engaging in violence. According to the SDLP the 
correct approach to change was via peaceful, constitutional means. It has also consistently 
argued for more Irish government involvement in the north and the importance of building 
relations throughout the island and between Ireland and Britain (The IRA set united Ireland 
back years: SDLP leader. 2005).  
The dominant discourse in the south has generally been negative to republicans in particular, 
who were viewed as trying to usurp the authority of the Irish government, while unionists were 
often viewed as intolerant (Hanley, 2018). However, the overarching element was a desire to 
keep the ‘Troubles’ in the north and out of the south. Official government censorship laws 
relating to the broadcast media, self-censorship in most of the Irish press and a general 
antagonism among newspaper owners towards republicans during that conflict reinforced and 
reproduced this dominant discourse (Corcoran & O’ Brien, 2005).  
Whilst a small number of Catholic priests may have been viewed as sympathetic to the 
republicans, the Catholic Church hierarchy was for the most part hostile to both the IRA and 
Sinn Féin during this period. Throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s the Bishops issued regular 
scathing condemnations of both IRA activity in the North and of Sinn Féin (Ó hAdhmaill, 
2013).2  
Competing discourses have also been reflected in the terminology used in naming the two 
separate jurisdictions created by partition. For example, when the then Irish Taoiseach (Prime 
Minister), Leo Varadkar, in May 2020 chastised Sinn Féin for referring to the Irish state as the 
‘South of Ireland’, ‘Free State’ or ‘the Southern State’ (in response to criticism (Ainsworth, 
2020) that he had referred to Belfast as being ‘overseas’), he was illustrating to all, the political 
nuances of language and indeed its power to create and reproduce particular 
meanings/representations in conflict situations. 
Since ‘Éire’ or ‘Ireland’ (in English) has been the official name of the Irish state since 1937 it 
is understandable that the then head of the Government might regard the use of any other name 
                                                          
2 See for example: the press statement by Bishop Cathal Daly, Bishop of Down and Connor (Irish News, 1984, 
January 3); the statements from Bishop Daly of Derry attacking the IRA (Irish News, 1984, October 20, p. 1; 
1986, September 1, p. 1); Bishop Cathal Daly attacking both the IRA and Sinn Fein (Irish News, 1984, January 
3, p. 7; 1985, March 15); Bishop Cathal Daly blaming the loyalist sectarian murder of a Catholic on IRA 
provocation (Irish News, 1988, August 12, p. 1; 1987, September 24, p. 1; 1986, March 19, p.1); the statement 




as insulting. However, this is where the complexities of discourse begin to unfold, because the 
‘argument’ over terminology reflects different discourses of both the past and the present and 
their legitimacy.  
When Ireland was partitioned in 1921, after a long, bitter, and divisive campaign for 
independence, the new entity south of the border was called the Irish Free State and continued 
to have ties to the UK state. The 1921 ‘agreement’ itself led to conflict, north and south of the 
border, with some republicans viewing the ‘Free State’ as something less than the republic that 
had been proclaimed in the 1916 rebellion (Ó hAdhmaill, 2019). They used the term ‘Free 
State’ as a derisory term while much of the population north and south used it simply as the 
official title. The current official name of the Irish state was set out in De Valera’s 1937 
Bunreacht na hÉireann (Irish Constitution) which changed the name to ‘Éire’, or ‘Ireland’ in 
English. Though a republic was legislated for and agreed with the UK by 1949, that name did 
not change (Daly, 2007). However, the name ‘Ireland’ referred to the whole of the island, north 
and south, in articles 2 and 3 of that Constitution, much to the annoyance of unionists north of 
the border who found this a threat and an insult to their own political entity – Northern Ireland 
(NI). It also placed a political imperative on successful Irish governments to promote 
‘reintegration of the national territory’ although outside of rhetoric at election time little was 
done by any government in that regard. 
It was not until the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, signed after nearly 30 years of further 
violent conflict (1969-97), that Bunreacht na hÉireann was changed to remove the claim that 
‘the national territory’ included ‘Northern Ireland’ and replace it with an aspiration for Irish 
unity instead. The Agreement also recognised anyone associated with the island of Ireland, 
north and south, as having equal entitlement to Irish citizenship. What is ‘Ireland’ therefore has 
been interpreted in different ways at different periods in Irish history and, even today, may 
reflect an ideological position, conscious or unconscious. 
Similar issues exist in relation to terminology used to describe Northern Ireland. Northern 
Ireland became the official name of the new entity composed of Ireland’s six north-eastern 
counties and created by the Government of Ireland Act 1920. The Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921, led 
to the legal acceptance of partition by the new Free State Government, even though its Minister 
of Defence and IRA leader, Michael Collins, continued to arm and finance the IRA in the north 
and encourage them to continue to destabilize the new regime there into 1922. Indeed, 
nationalist teachers in the north, rejecting the legitimacy of Northern Ireland continued to get 




nationalists including successive Irish governments rejected the legitimacy of the northern 
entity, officially termed ‘Northern Ireland’, with its own parliament but remaining as a region 
within the UK state. Most refused to recognise that legitimacy by calling it not by its official 
title, but instead by using terms like ‘the Six Counties’ or ‘the North’. Long-time Taoiseach 
and then President, Eamonn De Valera consistently referred to the north as the ‘Occupied Six 
Counties’. The then Taoiseach, Jack Lynch referred to it as ‘the Six Counties’ in a speech 
outlining Irish Government policy in September 1969 (Lynch, 1969). Later, another Taoiseach, 
Charlie Haughey was to term it a ‘failed political entity’ at the Fianna Fáil Ard Fheis in 1980 
and in subsequent years (NI a failed political entity, says Haughey. 1986). Despite the Belfast 
Agreement, many nationalists in the north still refer to ‘north’ and ‘south’ when referring to 
both parts of the island of Ireland. 
Discourses in conflicts often make analogies with revered events, actions, people of the past, 
based on ‘truth’ (for us) but influenced by myth, perspective, etc. They link ‘us’ with past 
‘heroes’ or past ‘heroic actions’ or with what is culturally revered in ‘our’ society today – 
including religion. In societies where religion is important then it has often been historically 
important to link ‘our fight’ to religion, to justify and sustain it (e.g., Crusade, Jihad, use of 
padres in armies). Past ‘heroic feats’ become part of folklore, song history, and the group’s 
discourse about its past and present. They help to explain who the group is in the present as 
well as what it did in the past. They also help explain who the enemy is or was. National 
anthems, songs of resistance, and national or group commemorations also link these discourses 
to emotions reinforcing and reproducing them. It is maybe of interest to note that the unofficial 
and apparently more popular ‘national anthem’ of Ireland, sung by supporters at sporting 
events, is not Amhrán na BhFiann (the official Irish national anthem in the Irish language) but 
The Fields of Athenry. This is a song about a man imprisoned for stealing corn during the 
Famine/Great Hunger in the 1840s and waiting to be shipped off to prison in Van Diemen’s 
Land. This may suggest a disconnect between the official state discourse and the rest of the 
population, raising questions about whether Irish people are more comfortable associating with 
loss and suffering than with making heroic stands on the battlefield! It may be a sign of 
continuing psychological trauma based on continuing political and ideological divisions on the 
island? On the other hand it may simply be that many Irish people (not being fluent in the 
language) may feel uncomfortable singing in Irish.   
Rebel songs tend to link republicans to (a usually failed) heroic struggle, accompanied by 




they lost a lot in the process; the deaths, the divisions of the Civil War, the loss of the north. 
The 32 County republic proclaimed in 1916 had not been achieved and the new state for most 
of the 20th century was unable to provide for its people, in the way that other European states 
had, with welfare states and full employment. It was not until the mid-1990s that a new wave 
of optimism began to enthuse the state, with the Celtic Tiger3 and Jackie’s Army4 (Ó 
hAdhmaill, 2016). It was also during this time that the peace process began to develop in the 
north.   
Indeed, some of the more militant republican songs seem to cause embarrassment and lead to 
condemnations in the media, as when a newly elected Sinn Féin TD joined the exuberant 
entourage in a rendition of ‘Come out ye Black and Tans’ in February 2020 (Hutton & Horgan-
Jones, 2020). Ironically, the same song reached no 1 in the Irish and UK charts and no 5 in the 
Australian charts, in January 2020, in an apparent protest against a proposal by an Irish 
government minister to officially commemorate the RIC as part of the Decade of 
Commemorations (Mangan 2020). That in itself is an example of some of the unresolved 
legacies of conflict on the island. Whilst all songs of resistance promote a particular discourse 
and challenge that of opponents some are much more overt that others. Róisín Dubh (my dark 
Roseleen) for example, was a patriotic song written in the 16th century in which references to 
Ireland are disguised as references to a woman who is loved. At the time, it would have been 
dangerous to be more overt. On the other hand, the republican song, The Ballad of Joe 
McDonnell, after one of the 1981 IRA Hunger Strikers in the north, directly challenges the 
dominant discourse about IRA ‘terrorism’:  
And you dare to call me a terrorist 
While you look down your gun 
When I think of all the deeds that you have done 
You have plundered many nations, divided many lands 
You have terrorized their peoples 
You ruled with an iron hand 
And you brought this reign of terror to my land 
                                                          
3 The Celtic Tiger refers to the unprecedented period of economic growth and employment in the Irish state from 
1995-2000.  
4 Jackie’s Army refers to the Ireland’s national soccer team supporters who experienced along with the nation a 




Orange5 songs usually in direct contrast to republican songs tend to depict a heroic besieged 
minority, holding out against overwhelming odds to be victorious in the end (e.g. The Sash, 
Derry’s Walls, Dolly’s Brae) (Radford, 2004). A notion of superiority and indeed machoism 
appears in many of the songs. The Billy Boys is one particularly blood-curdling song, which 
includes the line “We’re up to our knees in Fenian (Catholic) blood, Surrender or you’ll die”. 
Originally written in Glasgow for one of the sectarian gangs there (Davies, 2006) it is still 
played regularly at Orange demonstrations in the north and indeed sung at football matches 
(BBC Sport, 2014, April 16).   
Concepts of national identity as reflected in different discourses have also been affected by the 
conflict in Ireland. Up until partition most unionists had viewed themselves as ‘Irish’ (as well 
as British). At one Orange demonstration in 1920, one prominent unionist stated that they were 
all Irishmen, but they were also British and Britons and would never be slaves (Phoenix, 
1920/2020, July). At the 1892 Ulster Unionist Convention in Belfast, a banner proudly declared 
in Irish “Erin Go Bragh” (Ireland Forever) while Robert Shipboy McAdam, a unionist, was to 
the fore in the Irish language revival in Belfast in the late 19th century (and his name now adorns 
the Belfast MacAdaim Ó Fiaich Cultúrlann in the republican Falls Road area). Ireland’s 
Heritage Orange Lodge (Oidhreacht na hÉireann) in the north, had an Irish Language name, 
and banner with which it marched, at least up until the early 1970s (Ó Snodaigh, 1973; 
Pritchard, 2004; Phoenix, 1970/2020). However, as the new NI attempted to create its own 
distinct identity, separate from that in ‘the south’, identity and language along with 
commemorations, flags, statues, the teaching of history, and control of public space, all became 
important. As the new government in the south attempted to promote the Irish language as a 
national language, the NI government discouraged it (Andrews, 1997). Between 1924 and 1927 
the number of primary schools teaching Irish was halved and the numbers studying Irish as an 
extra subject fell considerably. The subsidy for Irish as an extra subject was abolished in 1934 
(Mac Póilin, 2006). Since then, the Irish language has been offered as an optional subject only 
in some (mainly Catholic) schools. Public signs in Irish were effectively banned under law by 
the 1949 Local Govt Act, which stated that only English could be used. The ban was lifted by 
the British Government in the early 1990s. Irish was banned in the legal system and in 
                                                          
5 The Orange Order was established in 1795 to unite Protestants in Ireland behind loyalty to the British Crown 
and defence against the majority Catholic population. The 12th July Orange Day marches commemorating the 
victory of the Protestant King William over the Catholic King James in 1690, accompanied by songs reinforce 





Parliament and there was no programming in Irish until radio programmes were introduced in 
the 1980s. The dominant discourse was that NI was British and English speaking, despite a 
minority discourse which rejected this. There was no official recognition of the language as 
being associated in any way with the north. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement changed the 
discourse in relation to Irishness and the Irish language to some extent. An Irish identity was 
legitimised as equally valid to a British one. Funding was made available to promote Irish 
language education, community projects and TV programmes, though an Irish Language Act 
has yet to be passed. While some unionists particularly associated with the DUP continue to 
view the language with hostility, sometimes making insulting comments about it (‘Curry my 
yogurt': DUP's Gregory Campbell criticised for 'ignorant' Irish language comments, 2014), 
others such as Linda Ervine and the Turas project in East Belfast have embraced it (Mitchell 
& Miller, 2019). 
Conflicting discourses also exist in relation to place names in the north (although the vast 
majority remain as anglicised forms of their original Irish names). For example, the official 
name of the city Londonderry has long been rejected by nationalists and most people south of 
the border, as a celebration of colonialism and dispossession. It rarely appears on official maps 
in ‘the south’ (on road signage ‘Derry’6 is used) or in broadcasts by the national media network 
RTE. Yet unionists embrace it as a reflection of their plantation city, their heritage. In 1984, 
after pressure from the nationalist controlled City Council the British Direct Rule 
administration at the time changed the Council’s name to Derry City Council much to the 
annoyance of unionists throughout Northern Ireland. However, the official name for the city, 
Londonderry, remains (Statutory Rules of N. I., 1984). The parliamentary constituency was re-
named Foyle (after the river running through it) as was the regional BBC station to avoid 
controversy and BBC journalists were instructed to use both names in broadcasts in equal 
measure. Interestingly the adjoining unionist majority constituency is called East Londonderry, 
though the nationalist political parties and the regional nationalist newspaper, The Irish News, 
refer to it as ‘East Derry’. Ironically the city is referred to as ‘Derry’ by its inhabitants and a 
number of predominantly unionist organisations in the city use the term. For example, ‘Derry’ 
not ‘Londonderry’ is used in the name of the unionist organisation, ‘The Apprentice Boys of 
                                                          
6 Derry is the anglicised form of the original Irish name Doire Cholmcille - St Colmcille’s settlement, ‘place of 




Derry’, which organises marches each year to commemorate the lifting of the siege of the 
Protestant plantation town of Derry, by the Catholic King James I in 16897. 
Despite demographic and political changes in the north of Ireland in recent years, which along 
with Brexit suggest a growing number in favour of Irish reunification, the people remain deeply 
divided in terms of identity, politics and attitudes to Irish re-unification. In the south the overt 
dominant discourse appears to be in favour of re-unification (reflected in Bunreacht na 
hEireann and in opinion polls). However, the obstacles to achieving this seem insurmountable 
(and not worth the trouble). When in July 2020 the new Taoiseach, Micheál Martin, castigated 
those calling for a border poll (contingencies for which are included in the Belfast Agreement) 
as being ‘unnecessarily divisive’, he was probably reflecting some of that sentiment. Of course, 
the border itself, as well as reflecting divisions on the island has also reinforced and reproduced 
division. For most of its existence there has been limited co-operation or dialogue between the 
two administrations, north and south, and it was not until the 1960s that a Taoiseach officially 
visited the Northern Ireland entity for the first time.  
While the Belfast Agreement and the end of the Troubles led to the removal of British Army 
checkpoints, and the creation of what is almost an invisible physical border, despite the 
promise, the development of cross border bodies and initiatives have been limited. Meanwhile 
within the north, while there has been some mixing of nationalists and unionists, particularly 
in middle class areas, segregated communal living remains a feature in both rural and urban 
areas, often reflecting demographic patterns laid down during the time of the plantations in the 
early 17th century. Indeed, the number of so-called peace walls has increased to around 116 
since the end of the armed conflict (Belfast Interface Project, 2017).  
However, there are some signs of changing discourses. In the past successive Unionist 
governments branded ‘Catholics’ as a threat to Northern Ireland who should be denied jobs 
(Farrell, 1976). In a clumsy attempt to win support from fellow Unionists for civil rights 
reforms in 1969, the then Unionist Prime Minister, Terence O’Neill echoed this discourse: 
It is frightfully hard to explain to Protestants that if you give Roman Catholics a good 
job and a good house they will live like Protestants because they will see neighbours 
with cars and television sets; they will refuse to have eighteen children. But if a Roman 
Catholic is jobless, and lives in the most ghastly hovel, he will rear eighteen children 
                                                          





on National Assistance. If you treat Roman Catholics with due consider and kindness, 
they will live like Protestants in spite of the authoritative nature of their Church. 
(Interview with Terence O'Neill, 1969).   
Whilst religious sectarianism remains a problem, it is now rarely mentioned in overt political 
discourse by political parties, a sign perhaps of the impact of strong equality legislation in the 
north since 1989 (Russell, 2012).  
In 2019, the EU Parliamentary and the Stormont Assembly elections witnessed major swings 
to the Alliance Party which has an open mind on the border and whilst both Sinn Fein and DUP 
remain the biggest parties there is no longer a political unionist overall majority (nor an overall 
nationalist one), McClements (2019). Whilst disagreement over Brexit and the NI Protocol 
(agreed between the UK and the EU) have, along with demographic changes,  raised tensions 
and led to some uncertainty about the future, Sinn Féin and the DUP share the First Minister 
role in the NI Executive established by the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 1998, and the 
notion of power-sharing with republicans, which had long been rejected by the majority of 
unionists, is now in operation between five parties, with little opposition (Hayward, 2020). 
Growing diversity and secularism north and south are reflected in the discourse of politicians 
and in the political process. Indeed power-sharing between old enemies in the north is now 
reflected in the south, where the two civil war parties which dominated politics as bitter 
opponents are now in Government together (Bray, 2020).  Whilst conflicting and changing 
political discourses about the past, present and possible future remain north and south in 
Ireland, it seems clear that there is no longer one (or even two) dominant political discourse(s), 
either north or south.  
One question not pursued by this paper and which may form the basis of future research might 
include how best to apply knowledge about competing discourses in conflict situations to 
promote peace building. Whilst constructive conflicts may be necessary to promote one’s 
version of progress and different ideas about how to organise the world are part of the human 
essence, it is also clear that some conflicting discourses can be challenged by social scientists 
where they are based on false, incomplete, misinterpreted or misleading ‘knowledge’ and 
information. However, how to do that without exacerbating a conflict situation is an acquired 
skill in itself. Another question not covered in this paper relates to what factors influence 
changes in competing discourses – social, economic, political and cultural, and to what extent 




exchange, changing life expectations, equality, human rights, diversity protection legislation, 
and social policy can impact on competing discourses and in which ways.  
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